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Inclusion, Voice, and Process-Based 
Constitutionalism
COLLEEN SHEPPARD *
This article explores a growing emphasis on process issues in the elaboration of constitutional 
rights and freedoms, focusing on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In a 
diverse range of contexts, judges are framing constitutional rights and freedoms in terms 
of the processes and practices they require, rather than in terms of specifi c constitutionally-
mandated substantive outcomes. Thus, constitutional rights have been interpreted to 
require a duty to negotiate, a duty to consult, a duty to accommodate, and entitlements to 
participate in democratic governance. The growing emphasis on processes and practices 
is positive to the extent that it resonates with new understandings of social regulation in 
modern society, empowers institutional and social actors as change makers, and reduces 
reliance on the judiciary as interpreters of the substantive content of rights in diverse 
social and institutional contexts. Values of democratic participation, institutional and 
social transformation, empowerment, and self-governance also emerge with the shift 
towards processes and practices. And yet, it is also important to consider whether and to 
what extent a focus on processes and practices risks undermining constitutional protections.
Cet article se penche sur l’importance croissante accordée aux questions de procédure 
lors de l’élaboration des droits et libertés constitutionnels, en se fondant sur la Charte 
canadienne des droits et libertés. Dans divers contextes, les juges considèrent les droits et 
libertés constitutionnels en termes des procédures et des pratiques nécessaires plutôt 
que des résultats significatifs qu’exige spécifiquement la constitution. Par conséquent, 
les droits constitutionnels sont réputés comporter un devoir de négociation, un devoir 
de consultation et un devoir d’accommodement, ainsi que le droit de participer à la 
gouvernance démocratique. L’importance croissante accordée aux procédures et aux 
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pratiques est positive dans la mesure où elle reflète une manière nouvelle d’interpréter 
la régulation sociale dans la société moderne, en conférant aux intervenants institu-
tionnels et sociaux le pouvoir d’opérer des changements et en réduisant le recours 
aux instances judiciaires comme interprètes du contenu de fond des droits dans divers 
contextes sociaux et institutionnels. La valeur de la participation démocratique, de la 
transformation institutionnelle et sociale, de la responsabilisation et de l’autorégulation 
est également soulignée par ce glissement vers les procédures et les pratiques. Pourtant, 
il importe également de se demander à quel point l’emphase mise sur les procé-
dures et les pratiques ne risque-t-elle pas de saper les protections constitutionnelles.
WE HAVE BEEN TRAVERSING an enormously rich period in constitutional law, both 
internationally and in Canada. Around the world, there is a signifi cant body of 
jurisprudence interpreting a wide array of constitutional rights, freedoms, and ob-
ligations. Th is article explores a growing emphasis on process issues in the elaboration 
of constitutional rights and freedoms, focusing on the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.1 In a diverse range of contexts, Canadian judges are framing constitutional 
rights and freedoms in terms of the processes and practices they require rather than in 
terms of specifi c constitutionally-mandated substantive outcomes. Th us, constitutional 
rights have been interpreted to require a duty to negotiate, a duty to consult, a duty to 
accommodate, and an entitlement to participate in democratic governance. Beyond the 
judiciary, debates amongst political theorists and legal scholars about constitutionalism 
increasingly highlight processes and practices by drawing on concepts like democratic 
accountability, accommodation of individuals and communities, dialogic democracy, 
participatory democracy, inclusive citizenship, and critical multiculturalism.2 
1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter].
2. See Part II, below.
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Th e growing emphasis on processes and practices is positive to the extent 
that it resonates with new understandings of social regulation in modern society, 
empowers institutional and social actors as change makers, and reduces reliance 
on the judiciary as interpreters of the substantive content of rights in diverse 
social and institutional contexts. Values of democratic participation, institutional and 
social transformation, empowerment, and self-governance have also emerged 
with the shift towards processes and practices. Yet it is also important to consider 
whether and to what extent a focus on processes and practices risks under-
mining constitutional protections. Do procedural rights—such as the right to 
be consulted or the right to have negotiations with no guarantee of reaching 
an agreement—defl ect the resolution of substantive legal issues from the courts 
back to inequitable institutional, political, or social contexts? In so doing, do 
they reinforce privatized power and privilege,3 or do they defer the eff ective 
realization of constitutional rights and freedoms indefi nitely? To what extent is 
assimilation into the institutional status quo a precondition to the exercise of 
procedural rights? It is important, therefore, to canvass both the promise and 
the perils of this interpretive shift and to think about how to shape such a shift 
to ensure that its future development reinforces, rather than undermines, the 
enhanced and eff ective protection of constitutional rights and freedoms.
I. PROCESS-BASED VALUES AND CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Th e shift towards process-based constitutionalism may be viewed as part of a 
larger shift towards process-based approaches to legal regulation. Gunther Teubner, 
for example, described the emergence of “refl exive law” back in the early 1980s.4 
He observed a trend towards a “policy of proceduralization” whereby the “legal 
system concerns itself with providing the structural premises for self-regulation 
within other social subsystems.”5 Developing similar themes regarding shifting 
approaches to state regulation, David Garland argues that the “project of 
establishing a sovereign state monopoly has begun to give way to a clear 
3. See Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law and the Challenge to 
Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). See also Frank I Michelman, 
“Constitutionalism, Privatization and Globalization: Whither the Constitution?” (2000) 
21:4 Cardozo L Rev 1063.
4. Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Refl exive Elements in Modern Law” (1983) 17:2 Law & 
Soc’y Rev 239.
5. Ibid at 274.
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recognition of the dispersed, pluralistic nature of eff ective social control. In this 
new vision, the state’s task is to augment and support these multiple actors and 
informal processes … .”6 Such a shift also resonates with the work of scholars 
of legal pluralism on the informal law embedded in “semi-autonomous social 
fi elds.”7 State legal regulation is increasingly understood to coexist with other 
sources of normativity that constitute the informal law within multiple and over-
lapping institutional and social contexts.8 As Susan Sturm explains, “Legal norms 
play the role of opening spaces for ongoing engagement about current practice 
in relation to aspirations that have been identifi ed to be of public signifi cance.”9 
She explores the role of law in institutionalizing “occasions for analysis, refl ection, 
relationship building, boundary renegotiations, and institution building.”10
Th e procedural turn in constitutional law also resonates with the rich literature 
in philosophy and political theory about “constitutionalism as a dialogic and 
conversational process.”11 Contemporary theorists of democracy have emphasized 
the importance of deliberative,12 dialogic,13 and communicative democracy,14 
which celebrate inclusion and diversity of representation and voice in political 
decision making. Increasingly, political theorists concerned with equality and 
diversity have insisted on the importance of recognition, redistribution, and 
democratic representation.15 
6. See David Garland, Th e Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001) at 126. Although Garland focuses on criminal 
justice and crime control, his insights about shifts in state regulatory strategies resonate with 
themes advanced in this article regarding the changing directions of constitutional law. 
7. See Sally Falk Moore, “Law and Social Change: Th e Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study” (1973) 7:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 719. See also Sally Engle Merry, 
“Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22:5 Law & Soc’y Rev 869.
8. Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” 
(1997) 12:2 CJLS 25.
9. “Owen Fiss, Equality Th eory, and Judicial Role” (2003) 2:1 Issues in Legal Scholarship (Article 
18) at 7 (examining the role of judges as catalysts for institutional change).
10. Ibid. See also Susan Sturm, “Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach” (2001) 101 Colum L Rev 458.
11. Jo Shaw, “Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union” (2000) 27:1 JL & 
Soc’y 4 at 23.
12. See e.g. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Th ompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004).
13. See Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: Th e Future of Radical Politics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens, Th e Th ird Way: Th e Renewal of Social Democracy 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998). See also Sarah Hale, Will Legget & Luke Martell, eds, Th e Th ird 
Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures and Alternatives (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
14. See e.g. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
15. See e.g. Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New 
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Canadian scholars have also endorsed the critical connection between 
participatory democracy and constitutionalism, which Simone Chambers 
describes as combining “the centrality of rights found in modern constitutionalism 
with the role of practice in ancient constitutionalism.”16 James Tully articulates 
a “philosophy and practice of constitutionalism informed by the spirit of mutual 
recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity.”17 Th is contemporary 
constitutionalism entails “negotiation and mediation of claims to recognition 
in a dialogue governed by the conventions of mutual recognition, continuity 
and consent.”18 Pursuant to this dialogic vision, the meaning and content of the 
constitution is dynamic, evolving, and connected to the lived and negotiated 
understandings of multiple communities, groups, and citizens.19 In rejecting 
a conception of constitutionalism based on the fi xed substantive meanings of 
constitutional provisions, these scholars focus not on judicial determinations of 
constitutional rights but on the lived realities of democratic public engagement. 
Similar trends have emerged in other jurisdictions. Jo Shaw has emphasized 
the importance of focusing on “key procedural, dialogic, and relational elements in 
a reworked conception of constitutionalism” in the European Union.20 Similarly, 
Colin Harvey has highlighted the signifi cance of new republicanism’s focus on 
participatory and deliberative democracy.21 Scholars of US constitutional 
law have theorized constitutionalism as a practice of democratic engagement that 
transcends judicial interpretation. For example, the meaning of rights has been 
linked to social relations and legal interpretation in everyday institutional contexts 
rather than exclusively in the courts.22 Th ere is also a rich debate about the 
signifi cance and contours of “popular constitutionalism.”23 
York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
16. “New Constitutionalism: Democracy, Habermas, and Canadian Exceptionalism” in Ronald 
Beiner & Wayne Norman, eds, Canadian Political Philosophy (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 63 at 75. See also Hester Lessard, “Jurisdictional Justice, Democracy and the 
Story of Insite” (2011) 19:2 Const Forum Const 93.
17. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 209.
18. Ibid.
19. See also Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community, and the 
Canadian Constitution (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994).
20. Supra note 11 at 21.
21. Governing After the Rights Revolution” (2000) 27:1 JL & Soc’y 61.
22. See e.g. Martha Minow, Making All the Diff erence: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). For a discussion on rights and relationships in 
Canadian and US constitutionalism, see also Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights and 
Constitutionalism” (2008) 7:2 J Hum Rts 139.
23. See e.g. Mark Tushnet, “Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law” (2006) 81:3 Chi-Kent L 
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II. EMERGING PROCESS-BASED VALUES IN THE FRAMING 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
Turning to the Canadian context, in the early days of Charter interpretation 
judges celebrated the new array of constitutionally entrenched rights and 
freedoms; they sought to interpret them liberally by giving them generous and 
substantive content.24 Th e affi  rmation of substantive equality in the Supreme 
Court’s early decisions on equality rights, for example, refl ected a signifi cant 
commitment to judicial activism in articulating the substantive content of rights 
and freedoms.25 The Court’s interpretation of “principles of fundamental 
justice” as including both procedural and substantive guarantees in relation to 
the protection of life, liberty, and security of the person further illustrates the 
early association of meaningful and robust constitutional rights protection with 
judicial articulation of the substantive content of Charter rights and freedoms.26 
Concerns with the intersection of rights, freedoms, and the processes and practices 
of constitutionalism were also explicitly considered from the outset of judicial 
interpretation of the Charter as a result of the constitutional mandate that any 
limits on rights and freedoms be consistent with the values and principles of a 
free and democratic society.27 As Chief Justice Dickson explained in R v Oakes:28 
Th e Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic 
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide 
variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political 
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.29
Certainly, procedural concerns also emerged in early Charter decisions about 
criminal procedure.30 However, in the early days of the Charter, the Supreme 
Rev 991 at 991-1006.
24. See e.g. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 at paras 116-
17, citing Canada (Combines Investigation Branch, Director of Investigation and Research) v 
Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 156-157, 160, 11 DLR (4th) 641.
25. See Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1. 
Recognition of eff ects-based violations of rights and freedoms further attests to robust 
substantive judicial interpretations of the Charter.  
26. See Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 at paras 17-19, 24 DLR (4th) 486
27. Supra note 1, s 1. Section 1 states: “Th e Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justifi ed in a free and democratic society.”
28. [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200.
29. Ibid at para 64 [emphasis added].
30. For an overview of procedural protections in the criminal context, see Robert J Sharpe & 
SHEPPARD, PROCESS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM 553
Court articulated a clear commitment to charting a new course of constitutional 
interpretation that went beyond the legal formalism and narrow interpretations 
of the Canadian Bill of Rights31 era. Th e predominant expression of this new era 
of judicial engagement with constitutionally entrenched rights and freedoms 
was a robust, liberal, generous, and substantive interpretation of Charter rights 
and freedoms. 
Th e procedural turn in the interpretation of rights and freedoms, though 
implicit in some of the early decisions, appeared to gain greater prominence in 
the late 1990s and into the new century.32 Th is new strand of proceduralism in 
Canadian constitutional rights jurisprudence goes beyond constitutional 
requirements for fair process (which has longstanding roots in administrative 
law). Rather, it engages process-based values that aff ect governance, community, 
and institutional decision making—values such as participatory democracy, 
dialogue, consultation, negotiation, and accommodation. 
One critical constitutional case that refl ects a growing trend towards the affi  rmation 
of process-based values in Canadian constitutionalism is the 1998 non-
Charter case, Reference re the Secession of Quebec.33 Building on a “living tree” vision 
of interpretation,34 the Court articulated four fundamental principles of Canadian 
constitutionalism: federalism, democracy, the rule of law, and protection of 
minority rights.35 Th ese principles constitute the “lifeblood” of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 36 and inform its interpretation, particularly in the face of silence or 
ambiguity in its written provisions.37 All of these fundamental constitutional 
principles implicate important process-related values.38  
Kent Roach, Th e Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009), ch 14.
31. SC 1960, c 44, reprinted in RSC 1985, App III.
32. For a review of the procedural justice dimensions of both early and more recent Charter cases, 
see Lorne Sossin, “Th e Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Procedural Justice as Aboriginal 
Rights” (2010) 23 Can J Admin L & Prac 93 at 96-97 [Sossin, “Th e Duty to Consult”]. See 
also Lorne Sossin, “Th e Promise of Procedural Justice” in Adam Dodek & David A Wright, 
eds, In the McLachlin Court’s First Ten Years: Refl ections of the Past and Projections of the Future 
(Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights Working Paper Series, 2010), online: <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911499>.
33. [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Secession Reference cited to SCR].
34. See Edwards v Canada (AG), [1930] AC 124, 1 DLR 98 at 136.
35. Secession Reference, supra note 33 at para 32.
36. 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 [Constitution Act, 1867].
37. Secession Reference, supra note 33 at para 51. For similar arguments regarding US 
constitutional law, see Lawrence Tribe, Th e Invisible Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008).
38. Even the minority rights principle resonates with a procedural concern with ensuring voice 
and fair treatment of minorities within a democratic polity.
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Recognition of these principles allowed the Court to provide a 
juridical response to the difficult questions at issue despite the absence of 
an express provision in the Constitution Act, 1867 for determining if and how 
provinces should be allowed to secede. Treading carefully through a minefi eld of 
political tensions, the Court linked its conclusions explicitly to process values: 
[C]onferring a right to initiate constitutional change on each participant in Confederation 
… imposes a corresponding duty on the participants in Confederation to engage in 
constitutional discussions in order to acknowledge and address democratic 
expressions of a desire for change in other provinces. Th is duty is inherent in the 
democratic principle which is a fundamental predicate of our system of governance.39
Th us, the Court held that the Canadian government would have a duty to 
negotiate with Quebec regarding its continued affi  liation or separation from 
Canada if a referendum revealed a genuine interest in secession on the part of 
a signifi cant majority in Quebec.40 Th ough the Court was careful to limit any 
potential judicial oversight of the duty to negotiate,41 the reasoning nonetheless 
provides an important example of the judicial turn towards a process-based 
resolution of complex and contentious constitutional questions. Did this focus 
on process allow the Court to avoid making certain substantive pronouncements, 
eff ectively using process to avoid substance? Or was the decision consistent 
with the Court’s growing sensitivity to the need to understand judging in 
relation to larger social and political dynamics—and the need to identify how 
concerns with democracy, federalism, minority rights, and the rule of law shape 
the parameters within which other social and political actors must engage? Judges, 
pursuant to this latter vision, are not always best suited to provide substantive 
answers to complex questions and should instead frame certain process-based 
obligations, such as a duty to negotiate. In so doing, judges act, in eff ect, as 
catalysts for others to engage with one another to come up with substantive 
solutions. Beyond its signifi cance in mediating a deeply contentious political 
issue regarding Quebec and the right of self-determination, the Secession 
Reference also had a broader infl uence because of its very clear endorsement 
of an approach to constitutional interpretation based on broad unwritten 
principles, values, and process-based duties. 
39. Secession Reference, supra note 33 at para 69.
40. Ibid at para 88.
41. As in other domains of constitutional adjudication, the Secession Reference refl ects the Court’s 
tendency to impose procedural duties while minimizing its role in reviewing compliance with 
those duties. See discussion in Parts III to VI, below.
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To what extent can we discern process-related shifts in other areas of 
constitutional law? When one examines various domains of constitutional litiga-
tion, a number of important examples emerge in relation to rights-based claims. 
In these domains, judges appear to be increasingly attentive to the ways in which 
constitutional rights and freedoms are mediated and given concrete signifi cance 
within diverse institutional, state, and non-state governance processes. One 
domain of Charter litigation where process-based values emerged relatively early 
was in cases involving linguistic minorities. The Court concluded that the 
educational rights of linguistic minorities include entitlements to participate in 
the “management and control” of minority language education.42 A second impor-
tant area where we have witnessed attentiveness to procedural duties concerns 
Aboriginal rights, entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.43 Th e 
Court has imposed duties upon governments to consult and to accommodate 
Indigenous communities, even prior to the fi nal adjudication or determination 
of Aboriginal rights claims.44  
Freedom of association is a third domain that has been infused by process 
values. Th ough initially accorded a narrow and limited defi nition, the Court has 
more recently interpreted freedom of association to acknowledge more fully the role 
of labour unions in advancing democracy in the workplace through processes of 
collective bargaining.45 Recognition of the constitutional value of collective bargaining 
in turn raises questions about legal duties on the part of employers to engage in 
good faith negotiations.46 Th ough not directly constitutional in character, this 
extension of duties to non-state actors marks a signifi cant blurring of the divide 
between the private and the public, and it has led the Court to impose positive 
duties on the state to prevent private actors from interfering with constitutional 
freedoms.47  
Building on developments in statutory human rights law, constitutional duties to 
accommodate have also been recognized in Charter cases. One important area 
42. See e.g. Mahe v Alberta, [1990] 1 SCR 342, 68 DLR (4th) 69 [Mahe cited to SCR]; Arsenault-
Cameron v Prince Edward Island, 2000 SCC 1, 1 SCR 3 [Arsenault-Cameron cited to SCR].
43. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]. 
44. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, 3 SCR 511 [Haida 
Nation cited to SCR].
45. Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 
SCC 27, 2 SCR 391 [Health Services cited to SCR]; Contra Reference Re Public Service 
Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 38 DLR (4th) 161 [Alberta Reference 
cited to SCR]. Th e Court in Health Services concluded that the holding in Alberta Reference 
no longer stands.
46. Ontario (AG) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, 2 SCR 3 [Fraser cited to SCR].
47. See also Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94, 3 SCR 1016 [Dunmore cited to SCR].
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL556
where this duty has emerged is in relation to religious freedom.48 Duties 
of accommodation have also arisen in the context of Aboriginal rights and the 
rights of persons with disabilities.49 Conceptions of the duty to accommodate 
include both substantive and procedural dimensions, with the latter resonating 
with our focus on institutional processes, practices, participation of various state 
and non-state actors, consultation, and voice issues.50 In all of these domains 
of constitutional law, we witness the courts grappling with questions such as 
democracy, governance, institutional relationships, and duties to consult, to 
accommodate, and to negotiate. It is important, therefore, to refl ect critically 
upon the signifi cance of framing rights through a process lens and to assess both 
the positive dimensions and the potential risks of these interpretive developments. 
III. DEMOCRACY IN INSTITUTIONS, WORKPLACES, AND 
COMMUNITIES
Perhaps the most signifi cant promise of process-based constitutionalism is an 
express concern with enhancing democratic governance, both in terms of 
identifying the constitutional value of democratic processes in public and 
private decision making, and in relation to obligations imposed on the state to 
listen to and consult with individuals and communities. For example, in the 
linguistic minority education cases, the Court endorsed a right of management 
and control of linguistic minority education by the aff ected community.51 In 
these cases, we witness the Court articulating a signifi cant conceptual connection between 
the protection of minority rights and mechanisms for inclusion, voice, and self-
governance.52 In the fi rst signifi cant ruling in this domain, Mahe v Alberta, Chief 
48. Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, 1 SCR 256, [Multani cited 
to SCR]; Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, 2 SCR 551, [Amselem].
49. On Aboriginal rights, see e.g. Haida Nation, supra note 44. On the duty to accommodate 
persons with disabilities, see e.g. Eldridge v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 
DLR (4th) 577.
50. See David M Lepofsky, “Th e Duty to Accommodate: A Purposive Approach” (1993) 1 Can 
Lab LJ 1. Th is article develops the idea of both a procedural and a substantive component to 
the duty to accommodate. Th e dual-pronged nature of the duty to accommodate was affi  rmed 
in the statutory anti-discrimination law context in British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
Relations Commission) v BCGSEU, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para 66, 176 DLR (4th) 1 [Meiorin].
51. See Mahe, supra note 42; Arsenault-Cameron, supra note 42.
52. For an extended discussion of the conceptual link between democratic self-governance and 
equality, see Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: Th e Relational Dimensions of Systemic 
Discrimination in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 119-35 
[Sheppard, Inclusive Equality].
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Justice Dickson concluded that, where numbers warrant, francophone parents 
should be accorded “a measure of management and control over the educational 
facilities in which their children are taught” because “[s]uch management and control 
is vital to ensure that their language and culture fl ourish.”53 He recognized 
that “minority language groups cannot always rely upon the majority to take 
account of all of their linguistic and cultural concerns. Such neglect is not neces-
sarily intentional: the majority cannot be expected to understand and appreciate all 
of the diverse ways in which educational practices may infl uence the language 
and culture of the minority.”54 Th us, it is not enough for the governing majority 
to set up schools and educational programs for the linguistic minority community; 
rather, the minority community itself should have signifi cant input into key 
decisions about curriculum, teachers, et cetera.55 Th e Court’s subsequent decision 
in Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island affi  rmed that “[e]mpowerment is 
essential to correct past injustices and to guarantee that the specific needs of the 
minority language community are the fi rst consideration in any given decision 
aff ecting language and cultural concerns.”56 
Although there are constitutional limits to these rights of management and 
control based on how large the linguistic minority community is (with 
disparate and very small communities having fewer constitutional entitlements)57 
the Court is nevertheless to be applauded for its attentiveness to the ways in 
which fundamental constitutional rights are realized and its recognition of 
processes for minority voices in the everyday decision-making processes governing 
linguistic minority education. Th ese cases provide a clear example of a process-
based framing of rights that mandates more participatory governance structures. In 
eff ect, constitutional language rights impose duties on provincial governments to 
set up governing processes and structures that allow for linguistic minority decision 
making, management, and control. Judicial decisions in these cases contribute to 
the establishment or reinforcement of governance structures that are attentive to 
the needs of minority communities. From an institutional capacity perspective, 
the linguistic minority cases are an interesting example of judges not assuming 
greater control over the substantive decisions in school boards necessary to 
protect constitutional rights; rather, they are extending decision-making power to 
the minority community whose lives are directly aff ected by institutional choices. 
53. Mahe, supra note 42 at para 60.
54. Ibid at para 61.
55. Ibid at para 60.
56. Arsenault-Cameron, supra note 42 at para 45.
57. See Charter, supra note 1, s 23.
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Th e labour cases regarding freedom of association also embrace democratic 
decision making as a constitutional value. In Health Services & Support –Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia,58 the Supreme Court overruled its 
previous decisions to conclude that freedom of association protects a procedural 
right to engage in collective bargaining. Th e impugned legislation, which was aimed 
at health care and social service workers, “invalidated important provisions 
of collective agreements then in force, and eff ectively precluded meaningful 
collective bargaining on a number of specifi c issues.”59 Affi  rming constitutional 
protection of collective bargaining resonates with process-based constitutional 
defi nitions. It goes beyond a formal and constitutive defi nition of freedom of 
association (meaning simply the freedom to come together as a group) and endorses 
instead a more functional and collective defi nition of freedom of association.60 
What is particularly signifi cant in relation to the recent affi  rmation of 
constitutional protection for collective bargaining is the Court’s express concern 
for workplace democracy and participatory governance as constitutional values. 
As noted by Chief Justice McLachlin in Health Services, “a constitutional right to 
collective bargaining is supported by the Charter value of enhancing democracy”:61 
Collective bargaining permits workers to achieve a form of workplace democracy 
and to ensure the rule of law in the workplace. Workers gain a voice to 
infl uence the establishment of rules that control a major aspect of their lives.62
Th is idea resonates with earlier articulations of the importance of collective 
bargaining to the advancement of democratic values at work.63  
It is also noteworthy that the value of democracy in the freedom of 
association cases is affi  rmed in the sphere of workplace governance—a context 
outside of the traditional public, political domain of democracy. Th is extension of 
democratic values beyond the formal institutions of the state affi  rms the importance of 
participatory democracy in the institutions of everyday life, including the workplace. 
Collective bargaining is about negotiating the rule of law in the workplace. Th e 
collective agreement becomes a governance document that goes beyond merely 
setting the narrow terms and conditions of employment (on a collective rather 
than individual level); it also represents the “constitution” for the workplace, 
58. Supra note 45.
59. Ibid at para 11.
60. See Alberta Reference, supra note 45, at paras 79-81, 97 (Dickson CJ, dissenting).
61. Health Services, supra note 45 at para 85.
62. Ibid. 
63. For an important early statement of the democratic role of unions, see Lavigne v Ontario 
Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 SCR 211, 81 DLR (4th) 545.
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regulating the relationship between employees and employers. Th eorists of 
participatory democracy have long argued that active citizenship in the political 
domain is reinforced and learned through active citizenship in the institutions of 
everyday life, such as workplaces, schools, and community organizations.64   
While the constitutional reinforcement of the values of democratic gover-
nance in minority linguistic education and unionized workplaces builds upon a 
discourse of participatory democracy and is to be celebrated, it is important to 
identify a few of the limits of this interpretive turn. First, the courts can be selective 
in terms of which types of associations, institutions, and communities are accorded 
entitlements to democratic self-governance. One important example concerns 
Aboriginal peoples. While specifi c democratic participation entitlements (for 
example, the rights of off -reserve residents to vote in band council elections)65 
have been recognized, the courts have been reticent to recognize broader 
entitlements to self-governance as a component of Aboriginal rights in section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, insisting instead that Aboriginal rights be framed 
in relation to specifi c traditions and practices.66 It is interesting to observe the 
more explicit recognition of participatory democracy and self-governance as a 
constitutional entitlement in more recently drafted Latin American constitutions, 
particularly in relation to Indigenous peoples.67  
A second concern regarding democracy is the risk of power imbalances in the 
institutions of civil society and/or in communities in which democratic self-
governance is constitutionally affi  rmed. Th ere is a risk that power inequalities 
64. See Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Th eory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970). See also Carole Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited” 
(2012) 10:1 Perspectives on Politics 7.
65. See Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Aff airs), [1999] 2 SCR 203, 173 
DLR (4th) 1.
66. R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821, 138 DLR (4th) 204. For a critique of judicial 
interpretations of section 35, see John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional 
Interpretation and the Trickster” (1997) 22:1 Am Indian L Rev 37. See also John Borrows, 
“Tracking Trajectories: Aboriginal Governance as an Aboriginal Right” (2005) 38:2 UBC L 
Rev 285; John Borrows, “Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and Violence Against Women” (2013) 
50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 699 (on the need for a living tree approach to the interpretation 
of section 35). Another context in which constitutional values of democracy appears to 
have been less well recognized is student democracy and the right of students to strike: see 
Christian Brunelle, Louise-Philippe Lampron & Myriam Roussel “La liberté d’expression en 
contexte de crise: Le cas de la grève étudiante” (2012) 53:4 C de D 831.
67. See e.g. Donna Lee Van Cott, Th e Friendly Liquidation of the Past: Th e Politics of Diversity in 
Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). See also Almut Schilling-
Vacafl or, “Bolivia’s New Constitution: Towards Participatory Democracy and Political 
Pluralism?” (2011) 90 Eur Rev Latin Am Caribbean Studies 3.
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and/or unequal structures of representation68 will undermine the possibility of 
equitable and eff ective democracy. To the extent that democracy endorses majority 
rule in many circumstances, it is also necessary to be attentive to shifting majority and 
minority statuses. While the extension of democratic self-government to peoples, 
communities, and organizations outside of state regulation can be a mechanism 
for enhancing equality and inclusion, it is critical to be attentive to ensuring that 
the voices of the least powerful and of minorities within these self-governing 
institutions and communities are heard.69
One fi nal concern is that constitutional entitlements to democratic gover-
nance will provide too little, too late. In the face of historical harms that have had 
real eff ects in terms of undermining autonomous self-governance, disempowering 
individuals and communities, entrenching structural and economic constraints 
to collective organizing, and enforcing assimilation, there is a considerable risk 
that, in many contexts, process-based entitlements may be insuffi  cient to reverse 
the continued eff ects of past abuses.70
IV. CONSULTATION, POWER, AND GOVERNANCE 
Listening to the concerns and voices of those aff ected by government decisions 
is critical to good governance. Governments have increasingly articulated 
commitments to undertake consultations before making decisions that will have 
signifi cant impacts on individual lives, communities, and society at large.71 
In most instances, consultation has been done as part of the political process 
68. See Rianne Mahon, “Canadian Public Policy: Th e Unequal Structure of Representation” 
in Leo Panitch, ed, Th e Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1977) 165.
69. For a discussion of these concerns in the trade union context, see Adelle Blackett & Colleen 
Sheppard, “Collective Bargaining and Equality: Making Connections” (2003) 142:4 Int’l 
Lab Rev 419. See also Young, supra note 14 at 141-48 (arguing for special representation 
rights for marginalized groups).
70. See e.g. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Th ey Came for the Children 
(Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2012) at 77-83, online: 
<http://www.attendancemarketing.com/~attmk/TRC_jd/ResSchoolHistory_2012_02_24_
Webposting.pdf> (documenting the continuing legacy of the harms of Aboriginal residential 
schools in Canada). See also Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 
SCC 62, 3 SCR 3, in which the provincial government continued to undermine minority 
language educational entitlements at the secondary school level in fi ve school districts in 
Nova Scotia despite fi ndings of critical levels of assimilation. 
71. Consulting With Canadians, online: Government of Canada <http://www.
consultingcanadians.gc.ca/hm.jspx?lang=eng>.
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in conjunction with government policy and legislative reform. It has not 
generally been recognized as a constitutional requirement. Nevertheless, in cases 
involving Aboriginal rights, courts have held that governments have constitu-
tional duties to consult and to accommodate. 
Most signifi cant in this regard is the 2004 decision in Haida Nation v British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests).72 Logging had been taking place in the territorial 
homelands of the Haida since before the First World War. Th e province of 
British Columbia began issuing logging licenses in 1961 to private forestry 
corporations. Th e Haida Nation increasingly voiced its concerns about the 
forestry operations and formally objected to the timber operations in 1994. In 
2000, the Haida Nation commenced a lawsuit challenging the issuance of forestry 
licenses to private corporations and claiming Aboriginal title over the lands being 
logged. As the litigation proceeded, the question arose as to whether the government 
had a constitutional duty to consult and accommodate the Haida Nation even 
prior to fi nal legal determination of the Aboriginal title claim. Given the 
signifi cance of the rights at stake, the Court concluded that the government has 
a “legal duty to consult” with the Haida people about the forestry licenses, and 
that such consultation may lead to an “obligation to accommodate.”73 Both 
duties were rooted in the constitutional requirement that governments uphold 
the “honour of the Crown” in all of their dealings with Aboriginal peoples.74 Th e 
honour of the Crown may also require “negotiations leading to a just settlement 
of Aboriginal claims”75 in some cases. Again, it is possible to discern a clear 
endorsement of process-based duties being imposed on the state as a component 
of its constitutional obligations. 
72. Supra note 44. In outlining the facts of the case, the Court noted:
 To the west of the mainland of British Columbia lie the Queen Charlotte Islands, the 
traditional homeland of the Haida people. Haida Gwaii, as the inhabitants call it, consists of 
two large islands and a number of smaller islands. For more than 100 years, the Haida people 
have claimed title to all the lands of the Haida Gwaii and the waters surrounding it. Th at 
title is still in the claims process and has not yet been legally recognized (at para 1).
73. Ibid at para 10. Similar process-based requirements are emerging in international Indigenous 
rights cases. See Alex Page, “Indigenous Peoples’ Free Prior and Informed Consent in the 
Inter-American Human Rights System” (2004) 4:2 Sustainable Dev L & Pol’y 16. On the 
duty to accommodate, see Part VI, below.
74. Interestingly, in a more recent case involving the duty to consult and Aboriginal peoples, 
Justice Deschamps identifi ed the “honour of the Crown” as an additional unwritten 
constitutional principle (drawing on the interpretive approach set out in the Secession 
Reference). See Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 97, 3 
SCR 103 [Beckman]. See also E Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” (2011) 54 Sup Ct 
L Rev 493.
75. Haida Nation, supra note 44 at para 20.
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On a positive note, Haida Nation appears to impose an obligation on governments 
to listen to the concerns and voices of Aboriginal peoples and, based on what it 
hears, to accommodate the concerns and needs of Indigenous communities. 
Th e Court emphasized that the “consultation must be meaningful,” explaining that 
“[m]eaningful consultation may oblige the Crown to make changes to its proposed 
action based on information obtained through consultations.”76 In a more recent 
case, the Court wrote:
As the post-Haida Nation case law confi rms, consultation is “[c]oncerned with an ethic 
of ongoing relationships” and seeks to further an ongoing process of reconciliation 
by articulating a preference for remedies “that promote ongoing negotiations.”77
Th e Court further described consultation as “a distinct constitutional process 
requiring powers to eff ect compromise and do whatever is necessary to achieve 
reconciliation of divergent Crown and aboriginal interests.”78
Although the constitutionalization of the duty to consult appears to be a 
positive juridical development, there are signifi cant limitations to the procedural 
guarantees regarding consultation with Aboriginal peoples. At a macro level, there 
is the historical context in which colonial authorities time and again negotiated 
treaties with Aboriginal peoples in ways that undermined their survival and well-
being or revoked promises and commitments made in treaties. For some critical 
scholars, this history significantly limits the value of any process-based 
consultations, accommodation, or treaty negotiations by or with non-Indigenous 
state and private actors.79 Current treaty negotiations have also been criticized for 
their underlying neo-colonial eff ects in which traditional lands are surrendered 
in exchange for fi nancial compensation. Th ese concerns present a signifi cant 
counter-narrative to the Court’s insistence on the “honour of the Crown” in its 
76. Ibid at para 46. Th e Federal Government has set guidelines for meaningful consultation. 
See Minister of the Department of Aboriginal Aff airs and Northern Development Canada, 
Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines for Federal Offi  cials to Fulfi ll 
the Duty to Consult (Ottawa: Aboriginal Aff airs and Northern Development Canada, 2011), 
online: Aboriginal Aff airs and Northern Development Canada <http://www.aadnc-aandc.
gc.ca/eng/1100100014664/1100100014675>.
77. Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, 2 SCR 650 at para 38 
[Rio], citing Dwight G Newman, Th e Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal 
Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2009) at 21.
78. Rio, supra note 77 at para 74.
79. Taiaiake Alfred & Jeff  Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary 
Colonialism” (2005) 40:4 Gov’t & Oppos 597. See also Joyce A Green, “Towards a Detente 
with History: Confronting Canada’s Colonial Legacy” (1995) 12 Int’l J of Can Stud 85.
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dealings with Aboriginal peoples and raise considerable doubt about any historic 
respect for fi duciary obligations to act in the best interests of Aboriginal peoples. 
In addition to these macro-historical critiques linked to the continuing 
realities of contemporary colonialism, a number of specifi c limitations can also 
be identifi ed in relation to the duty to consult articulated in the Court’s jurispru-
dence. First, the duty applies exclusively to public actors and does not extend to 
private corporations.80 Th e duty also does not require the state to secure compliance 
with consultation or accommodation obligations of private actors.81 Second, the 
Court was careful to note that the duty to consult does not imply any duty to 
reach an agreement.82 It is a constitutionalized procedural entitlement that does 
not dictate any substantive result. Th ird, the Court indicated that the obligation 
to consult prior to the determination of Aboriginal title does not accord a 
veto power to the Haida over decisions regarding logging.83 Fourth, the Court 
was vague about what constitutes meaningful consultation, explaining that the 
content of the duty varies depending on circumstances and the strength of the claim 
that is being litigated.84 Finally, it appears that the Court narrowed the scope of 
the Haida Nation decision by limiting when the duty to accommodate arises, 
specifi cally limiting its applicability to new and future adverse eff ects rather than 
historical harms.85 Th ese limitations raise concerns about the risks of the procedural 
turn. Consultation may be partial or inadequate, and it may not yield consensus 
or agreement. Moreover, governments may still seek to legitimize certain 
80. Unlike the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada did not fi nd 
that the private forestry corporation, Weyerhaeuser, had any process-based duties toward 
the Haida people; nor could the provincial government delegate its duty to consult and 
accommodate to a private corporation.
81. See Haida Nation, supra note 44 at paras 52-54. More recently, the Court of Appeal for 
British Columbia further limited the scope of the constitutional duty to consult and 
accommodate, fi nding that the duty does not apply to municipalities. See Neskonlith Indian 
Band v Salmon Arm, 2012 BCCA 379, 12 WWR 1.
82. Haida Nation, supra note 44 at para 10.
83. Ibid at para 48. Th e Court distinguished this case from one in which legal rights 
and entitlements had been adjudicated. See Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 
3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw cited to SCR].
84. Haida Nation, supra note 44 at para 46. Th e Court did refer to New Zealand policies on 
meaningful consultation with the Māori as a model.  
85. In cases following Haida Nation, however, the Court appears reluctant to fi nd violations 
of the duty to consult or to accommodate. See e.g. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British 
Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, 3 SCR 550; Rio, supra note 77; 
Beckman, supra note 74; Quebec (AG) v Moses, 2010 SCC 17, 1 SCR 557. Th e Court 
did fi nd a violation in a recent case. See Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, 3 SCR 388.
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policy choices and decisions by highlighting prior consultation with Aboriginal 
communities. 
One final consideration regarding consultation revolves around the 
questions: With whom does the government consult? Who represents the 
interests of particular communities? And is there a risk of partial consultation 
in which certain less powerful members of a community are excluded from the 
consultation processes? Th is risk of exclusion emerged as a key concern in 
an important Canadian constitutional case involving the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada a decade prior to the Haida Nation case.86 During the 
constitutional reform processes of the early 1990s leading up to the negotiation 
of the Charlottetown Accord, the federal government initiated a consultation process 
with four national Aboriginal organizations. Th e four organizations were provided 
with ten million dollars to fund their participation in the consultation initiatives. Th e 
Native Women’s Association of Canada was not funded; the four funded groups did 
direct a small portion of their funds (one per cent) to women’s issues.87  
Using innovative legal arguments that endeavoured to secure a vision 
of constitutional freedoms that included positive entitlements, the Native 
Women’s Association of Canada maintained that Aboriginal women were 
denied equality in the exercise of their freedom of expression by the government’s 
failure to provide suffi  cient funding to support the organization’s full and eff ective 
participation in the constitutional consultation. Although the argument was 
rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Mahoney of the Federal 
Court of Appeal agreed that the “Canadian government [had] accorded 
advocates of male-dominated aboriginal self-governments a preferred position 
in the exercise of expressive activity … which has had the eff ect of restricting 
the freedom of expression of [A]boriginal women … .”88 Concluding that the 
funding was so disparate as to be prima facie inadequate, the Federal Court 
of Appeal ordered the government to take positive measures to achieve 
gender equity in consultation processes. Although this fi nding was reversed on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,89 it remains an important illustration of 
the judicial concern for equity in government consultation processes. It reminds 
us that it is critical to remain attentive to who is consulted, the extent of the duty 
to consult, and the ways in which consultation takes place.
86. Native Women’s Association of Canada v Canada, [1994] 3 SCR 627, 119 DLR (4th) 224 
[NWAC SCC cited to SCR].
87. Ibid at 634-35.
88. Native Women’s Association of Canada v Canada, [1992] 3 FC 192, 95 DLR (4th) 106 at para 28 (CA).
89. NWAC SCC, supra note 86.
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V. NEGOTIATION AND GOVERNANCE: RIGHTS AND DUTIES  
Imposing a constitutional duty to negotiate on the government is another 
example of the procedural turn. As in the case of consultation, the endorsement 
of the negotiation of Aboriginal rights must confront a history and continued 
reality of rights violations.90 As we saw in the Secession Reference, fundamental 
constitutional principles may require that parties negotiate the terms of their 
continued engagement, relationship, and shared issues of governance.91 Th e idea 
of negotiation resonates with the idea of an ongoing relationship in which parties 
engage in a dialogue towards achieving some common agreement. Th e value of 
negotiated agreements also emerges in the Aboriginal context, where the Court 
has repeatedly emphasized that negotiations are the best vehicle for advancing 
reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. As noted in R v 
Sparrow,92 section 35(1) “provides a solid constitutional base upon which 
subsequent negotiations can take place.”93 As in the case of consultation, the 
endorsement of the negotiation of Aboriginal rights must confront a history and a 
continued reality of rights violations. Negotiation cannot be reduced to a process 
whereby Aboriginal peoples give up rights and entitlements.
In some instances, the constitutional value of negotiation may require the 
state to impose duties to negotiate on private actors.94 Such is the case in the 
domain of freedom of association and trade unions. At the outset, it is important 
to point out that in affi  rming the constitutional protection of collective bargaining, 
the Court has been careful to distinguish the process from its outcomes, emphasizing 
that “it is entirely possible to protect the ‘procedure’ known as collective bargaining 
without mandating constitutional protection for the fruits of that bargaining 
process.”95 It has further explained that the Charter “protects associational collective 
activity in furtherance of workplace goals. Th e right is not merely a paper right, 
but a right to a process that permits meaningful pursuit of those goals.”96 Th us, in 
90. While often occurring in conjunction with consultation, negotiation diff ers to the extent that 
it requires joint decision making and confl ict resolution.
91. Supra note 33.
92. [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385 [Sparrow cited to SCR]. Th is case was cited with 
approval in Delgamuukw, supra note 83 at para 186.
93. Sparrow, ibid at 1105. 
94. See Dunmore, supra note 47 at para 29: “Once the state has chosen to regulate a private 
relationship such as that between employer and employee, I believe it is unduly formalistic to 
consign that relationship to a ‘private sphere’ that is impervious to Charter review.”
95. Health Services, supra note 45 at para 29.
96. Fraser, supra note 46 at para 38 [emphasis added]. For further discussion of the Fraser case, 
see Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds, Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: 
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freedom of association cases, the Court has endeavoured to distinguish process 
from substantive outcomes and to affi  rm the need to adjudicate the adequacy of 
processes, while taking pains to remain neutral on substantive outcomes.
In Fraser v Ontario (Attorney General),97 the Court was faced with the question 
of whether legislation allowing farm workers to unionize and engage in collective 
bargaining in Ontario had to include provisions imposing a duty on both sides 
to engage in good faith bargaining. Th e Court had already held that the historic 
exclusion of farm workers from general collective bargaining legislation violated 
their eff ective enjoyment of the freedom of association.98 When the provincial 
legislature introduced legislation to comply with that ruling, it omitted any explicit 
duty to negotiate in good faith, a standard clause in most collective bargaining 
legislation.99 In a divided ruling in Fraser, a majority of the Court concluded that 
one could read a duty to negotiate in good faith into the new legislation, thereby 
securing collective bargaining rights for farm workers even though it was not 
expressly included.100 Th e majority, therefore, concluded that the new legislation 
was in compliance with constitutional norms of freedom of association.   
In a persuasive dissenting judgment, Justice Abella rejected the constitutionality 
of the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002.101 She emphasized that earlier 
jurisprudence had recognized that the “duty to consult and negotiate in good 
faith” were integral to collective bargaining.102 As she explained, according consti-
tutional protection to collective bargaining “does not guarantee that a collective 
agreement will be achieved, but good faith bargaining does require that the parties 
meet, engage in a meaningful dialogue, and make reasonable eff orts to arrive at a 
collective agreement.”103 For Justice Abella, collective bargaining involves “mean-
ingful dialogic consultation.”104 Accordingly, the legislature’s failure to include 
a specific duty to negotiate in good faith, with remedial consequences for 
non-compliance, impugned the legislation’s constitutionality. 
Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012). See also Judy Fudge, 
“Constitutional Rights, Collective Bargaining and the Supreme Court of Canada: Retreat 
and Reversal in the Fraser Case” (2012) 41:1 Indus LJ 1.
97. Supra note 46 at para 38.
98. Dunmore, supra note 47.
99. For references to Wagner-style collective bargaining legislation, see Fraser, supra note 46 at 
para 169.
100. Ibid at para 107.
101. SO 2002, c 16; Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A, s 3(b.1).
102. Fraser, supra note 46 at para 326, citing Health Services, supra note 45 at para 97. Th e Court 
stated the duties were found to be a “fundamental precept” of collective bargaining.
103. Fraser, ibid at para 326, citing Health Services, supra note 45 at paras 90, 101.
104. Fraser, ibid at para 327.
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While the labour cases on freedom of association provide another example 
of the articulation of constitutional norms in procedural terms, one critique of 
the procedural turn is the impossibility of dissociating procedure from substance. 
Th e background framework of process-based rights and duties vis-à-vis collective 
bargaining have a direct impact on bargaining power and thus on the 
substantive outcomes. Th us, it is critical to take into account the substantive and 
redistributive dimensions of process-based constitutional norms and values. 
Beyond collective bargaining and constitutional protections for freedom of 
association, duties to negotiate and procedural approaches to rights have emerged 
in other workplace contexts. Legislation on employment, pay equity, and 
occupational health and safety generally mandate the participation of employees 
and unions in developing programs and workplace initiatives.105 Th e process-
based provisions in these domains are embedded in various statutory, rather than 
constitutional, provisions; yet they resonate with constitutional concerns because 
they aff ect basic rights to equality, physical and psychological security of the person, 
and non-discrimination. They must also be consistent with fundamental 
constitutional rights and freedoms. Refl ecting new forms of social governance, they 
delegate responsibility to private actors to achieve identifi ed public objectives.106 
While these developments are positive and create opportunities for legal interpretation 
and implementation in the institutional relationships of everyday life, they also 
risk transferring rights issues to private actors and institutions characterized by 
continued inequities of power and privilege. 
In the domain of pay equity, for example, it is diffi  cult to implement eff ective pay 
equity policies if employees do not have eff ective access to information or lack 
suffi  cient power to participate eff ectively in processes of institutional change.107 
Th ere is also a very real risk that process rights will replace rather than reinforce 
substantive human rights. A troubling example of such a trend is the federal Public 
Sector Equitable Compensation Act,108 which took pay equity for federal public servants 
out of the Canadian Human Rights Act109 (where it was subject to substantive 
105. See Sheppard, Inclusive Equality, supra note 52 at 119-35.
106. For a parallel argument in the criminal law context, see Garland, supra note 6.
107. For a review of best practices in implementing pay equity, see Marie-Th érèse Chicha, “A 
comparative analysis of promoting pay equity: models and impacts” (International Labour 
Organization Working Paper No. 49, September 2006) at 53-59, online: <http://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_decl_
wp_27_en.pdf >.
108. SC 2009, c 2 [PSECA].
109. RSC 1985, c H-6.
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adjudication and remedies) and mandated that it be negotiated instead.110 By 
imposing a joint responsibility on unions and employers to negotiate pay equity111 
this law eff ectively reduced the right to sex equality in compensation to a right 
to negotiate such equality.112 While negotiation may advance the eff ective enjoy-
ment of rights and be pragmatic and attentive to specifi c institutional realities, it 
is important to identify circumstances where negotiating about fundamental human 
rights is inconsistent with basic principles of substantive human rights protection.
VI. ACCOMMODATION DUTIES: SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL DIMENSIONS 
Human rights legislation increasingly includes duties to accommodate, which 
have been interpreted to include both substantive and procedural dimensions.113 
Another area in which a procedural discourse has emerged is in the context of 
religious freedom. In the face of an expansive and largely subjective inter-
pretation of freedom of religion, constitutional debate has focused on defi ning 
reasonable limits to the exercise of religious freedoms.114 In defi ning these limits, 
the Court has imposed a duty to accommodate on governments vis-à-vis religious 
minorities. One leading decision that illustrates the importance of the duty to 
accommodate from a constitutional perspective is Multani v Marguerite-Bourgeoys 
(Commission scolaire),115 a case involving the question of whether a young Sikh 
student could wear a kirpan, or ceremonial dagger, to school.  
110. PSECA, supra note 108, s 239.
111. See ibid, ss 12-24.
112. For critiques of the pay equity reforms, see Parliament of Canada, An Analysis of the Eff ects of 
the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act: Report of the Standing Committee on the Status 
of Women, online: Coalition for Pay Equity <http://www.equite-equity.com/userfi les/fi le/
FEWO_Report_June19-e%5B1%5D.pdf>; and Letter from various concerned persons to 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper (23 February 2009), online: Equality Rights Central <http://
www.equalityrightscentral.com/papers_docs/20100628105956/payequityletterfi nal2009.pdf>.
113. See Meiorin, supra note 50 at para 66: “Notwithstanding the overlap between the two 
inquiries, it may often be useful as a practical matter to consider separately, fi rst, the 
procedure, if any, which was adopted to assess the issue of accommodation and, second, 
the substantive content of either a more accommodating standard which was off ered or 
alternatively the employer’s reasons for not off ering any such standard …” [emphasis 
in original]. See generally Lepofsky, supra note 50. Th ere is considerable debate about 
the notion of accommodation and whether it fails to challenge dominant norms and 
the institutional status quo. See also Shelagh Day & Gwen Brodsky, “Th e Duty to 
Accommodate: Who Will Benefi t?” (1996) 75 Can Bar Rev 433 at 462.  
114. Amselem, supra note 48.
115. Supra note 48.
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After concluding that Gurbaj Singh Multani’s religious freedom was violated 
by the school’s general requirement that no weapons be brought to school, the Court 
found that he should be accommodated, provided such accommodation does not 
cause undue hardship to the school or other students.116 Th e duty to accommodate 
was accordingly read into the minimal impairment prong of the Oakes test under sec-
tion 1 of the Charter. Writing for the majority, Justice Charron explained:
In relation to discrimination, the courts have held that there is a duty to make 
reasonable accommodation for individuals who are adversely aff ected by a policy 
or rule that is neutral on its face, and that this duty extends only to the point at 
which it causes undue hardship to the party who must perform it. Although it is 
not necessary to review all the cases on the subject, the analogy with the duty 
of reasonable accommodation seems to me to be helpful to explain the burden 
resulting from the minimal impairment test with respect to a particular individual, 
as in the case at bar.117 
Applying the duty of reasonable accommodation, the Court concluded that the 
school commission should have accommodated the student and allowed him to wear 
the kirpan, provided he took a series of precautions to ensure the safety of others.118 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the school had initially proposed a compromise and 
that informal institutional channels had produced an agreement between the parties: 
On December 21, 2001, the school board, the Commission scolaire Marguerite Bour-
geoys (“CSMB”), through its legal counsel, sent Gurbaj Singh’s parents a letter in 
which, as a [TRANSLATION] “reasonable accommodation”, it authorized their 
son to wear his kirpan to school provided that he complied with certain conditions 
to ensure that it was sealed inside his clothing. Gurbaj Singh and his parents agreed 
to this arrangement.119 
As is the case in classrooms and schools across the country, accommodation had 
been arranged through everyday processes of discussion and compromise.120 
Th is decision to accommodate, however, was overturned by the Council of the 
Commission, prompting the subsequent litigation.121
116. Ibid at para 53.
117. Ibid at para 53, citing José Woehrling, “L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable et 
l’adaptation de la société à la diversité religieuse” (1998) 43 McGill LJ 325 at 360.
118. Multani, ibid at para 99.
119. Ibid at para 3.
120. For a review of accommodation practices in Quebec schools, see Marie McAndrew, 
“Immigration and Diversity in Quebec’s Schools: An Assessment” in Stephan Gervais, 
Christopher Kirkey & Jarrett Rudy, eds, Quebec Questions: Quebec Studies for the 21st Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 287 at 287-304.
121. Multani, supra note 48 at paras 4-12 (outlining the procedural history of the case). 
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In an interesting concurring opinion, Justices Deschamps and Abella 
maintained that in cases involving the duty to accommodate and the exercise 
of discretion by public offi  cials, courts should rely upon an administrative law 
approach rather than a constitutional law approach.122 Th ey emphasized that 
“administrative law analysis is microcosmic, whereas a constitutional law analysis 
is generally macrocosmic”:123
Th e process required by the duty of reasonable accommodation takes into account 
the specifi c details of the circumstances of the parties and allows for dialogue 
between them. Th is dialogue enables them to reconcile their positions and fi nd 
common ground tailored to their own needs.124 
Th e duty to accommodate pursuant to this approach is best understood as part of 
the exercise of administrative discretion infused with constitutional values of dialogue, 
reconciliation, and accommodation.125 For Justices Abella and Deschamps, 
accommodation within an institutional context diff ers signifi cantly from what 
should be required under a minimal impairment analysis of a general law or 
policy in section 1. Th e latter entails a more general inquiry regarding legislative 
provisions in which the “justifi cation of the infringement is based on societal 
interests, not on the needs of the individual parties.”126  
A more recent freedom of religion case again raised questions about consti-
tutional duties of accommodation.127 Th e case concerned the question of whether 
members of the Hutterian Brethren could be exempted from the requirement of 
being photographed for identifi cation purposes for provincial drivers’ licenses. 
Th e Hutterian Brethren objected to being photographed on religious grounds. 
Th e case focused on section 1 of the Charter, since both sides agreed that there 
had been a violation of religious freedom. In her majority judgment, Chief Justice 
For a description of the Council of the Commission, see Commission Scholaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, online: Conseil des commissaires de la CSMB <http://www.csmb.qc.ca/fr-CA/
commissaires/commissaires-csmb.aspx.>.
122. Multani, ibid at para 85.
123. Ibid at para 132.
124. Ibid at para 131.
125. For examples where constitutional and human rights values have infused judicial oversight 
of the exercise of government discretion, see Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community 
Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, 3 SCR 134; Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, 1 SCR 3; Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193.
126. Multani, supra note 48 at para 132.
127. Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, 2 SCR 567 [Hutterian Brethren 
cited to SCR].
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McLachlin rejected the applicability of the duty to accommodate in section 1, 
writing that
where the validity of a law of general application is at stake, reasonable accommodation is 
not an appropriate substitute for a proper s. 1 analysis based on the methodology of Oakes. 
… Th e government is entitled to justify the law, not by showing that it has accommodated 
the claimant, but by establishing that the measure is rationally connected to a pressing 
and substantial goal, minimally impairing of the right and proportionate in its eff ects.128 
In contrast to Justice Charron’s approach in Multani, which treated the 
minimal impairment analysis as functionally equivalent to a reasonable 
accommodation assessment, Chief Justice McLachlin distinguished the two 
analyses, drawing on the concurring opinions of Justices Abella and Deschamps 
in Multani. Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that despite the violation of 
religious freedom, a universal photo-ID requirement was justifi ed under 
section 1 to advance the government’s objective of reducing identity theft.129 
Th e majority’s endorsement of the observations of Justices Deschamps and 
Abella in Multani about the limits of integrating a duty to accommodate into a 
section 1 minimal impairment analysis was ironic because Justice Abella herself 
dissented in Hutterian Brethren, applying the minimal impairment analysis robustly 
in ways that resonate with the idea that we should endeavour to accommodate 
religious minorities. She concluded that the universal photograph requirement 
did not minimally impair religious freedom, and that the proposed alternative of 
a license without a photograph would not significantly interfere with the 
government’s objective of reducing identity theft. Although Justice Abella relied on 
the language of minimal impairment, the eff ect of her judgment is to ensure that 
the Hutterian Brethren are accommodated in their request for an exemption from 
the photo-ID requirement. Justice Abella would have suspended the declaration 
of invalidity “for one year to give Alberta an opportunity to fashion a responsive 
amendment.”130 In short, the religious freedom cases appear to endorse duties to 
accommodate in institutional contexts (e.g., schools and court proceedings131); 
however, we may be witnessing an emerging reticence to impose duties of accommodation 
on legislators, particularly when constitutional challenges are directed at facially 
128. Ibid at para 71. Chief Justice McLachlin’s judgment is reminiscent of the majority decision 
in Bhinder v CN, [1985] 2 SCR 561, 7 CHRR D/3093, where the Court had diffi  culty 
conceptualizing a duty to accommodate where a general bona fi de occupational requirement 
defense was available.
129. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 127 at para 104.
130. Ibid at para 177.
131. R v S(N), 2010 ONCA 670, 102 OR (3rd) 161.
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neutral laws and regulations that can be linked to a valid secular purpose.132 
As noted above in Part V, another context in which the duty to accom-
modate has emerged concerns Aboriginal rights. In the Haida Nation case, the 
Court noted that “the eff ect of good faith consultation may be to reveal a duty to 
accommodate.”133 Th e idea of accommodation is closely connected to processes 
of reconciliation:
Th e terms “accommodate” and “accommodation” have been defi ned as to “adapt, 
harmonize, reconcile” ... “an adjustment or adaptation to suit a special or diff erent 
purpose ... a convenient arrangement; a settlement or compromise”: Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English (9th ed. 1995), at p. 9. Th e accommodation that may 
result from pre-proof consultation is just this—seeking compromise in an attempt 
to harmonize confl icting interests and move further down the path of reconciliation. 
A commitment to the process does not require a duty to agree. But it does require 
good faith eff orts to understand each other’s concerns and move to address them.134
While concepts such as reconciliation and harmonization have positive dimensions, 
there remains a very signifi cant concern that accommodation may be asymmetrical, 
favouring historically dominant groups and interests. Indeed, in a very diff erent 
context, feminist scholars have critiqued the very notion of accommodation as being 
inherently assimilationist: 
Accommodation does not go to the heart of the equality question, to the goal of 
transformation, to an examination of the way institutions and relations must be 
changed in order to make them available, accessible, meaningful and rewarding for 
the many diverse groups of which our society is composed. Accommodation seems 
to mean that we do not change procedures or services, we simply “accommodate” 
those who do not quite fi t. We make some concessions to those who are “diff erent”, 
rather than abandoning the idea of “normal” and working for genuine inclusiveness.135
Th erefore, though intended to advance reconciliation between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal Canadians, concepts like accommodation and compromise risk 
not being suffi  ciently transformative. 
132. Th is reticence corresponds to the Court’s increasing unwillingness to fi nd adverse eff ect 
discrimination in relation to section 15 claims. See Hutterian Brethren, supra note 127 at 
paras 106-08. It may also be linked to a continued individualistic rather than collective 
interpretation of religious freedom.
133. Haida Nation, supra note 44 at para 47. Th e Court notes: “When the consultation process 
suggests amendment of Crown policy, we arrive at the stage of accommodation.” See also 
(ibid) at para 48. Th e Court states: “Th is process does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over 
what can be done with land pending fi nal proof of the claim.”
134. Ibid at para 49.
135. Day & Brodsky, supra note 113 at 462. 
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VII. THE PROMISE AND RISKS OF THE PROCEDURAL TURN 
Reflection on these examples brings to light both positive and negative 
dimensions of the procedural turn in constitutional interpretation. On the one 
hand, this turn holds signifi cant promise for those without power or privilege 
in our society, according them rights to participate in social and institutional 
decision-making processes. It reinforces and builds upon the values of democratic 
participation in critical institutions of everyday life (such as workplaces and schools), 
consultation, institutional and social transformation, and self-governance using 
constitutional norms to reinforce more equitable and inclusive processes 
for hearing historically excluded voices. It allows for continued change and 
self-correction, particularly when problems are relational, structural, intergen-
erational, and systemic. It goes beyond the traditional instrumental, top-down 
model for the enforcement of laws and integrates legal norms into governance 
structures and processes. Th e procedural turn in constitutional interpretation 
highlights democratic values and recognizes key structural, systemic, relational, 
and institutional dimensions of constitutional rights and freedoms. In these 
ways, process-based constitutionalism reinforces a conception of contemporary 
constitutionalism that values dialogue, negotiation, voice, democracy, inclusion, 
accommodation, and consultation. 
On the other hand, the Canadian cases also illustrate the risks associated 
with this interpretive turn. If legal interpretation secures process rather than 
substance, it may undermine the legal recognition of certain substantive rights 
and undermine the possibility of obtaining concrete substantive remedies using 
constitutional litigation. Process rights become a substitute for substantive rights, 
which may never be realized. Processes for participation, consultation, and 
dialogue are mapped onto institutional and political contexts of inequitable 
power and privilege. Th ese constitutionally mandated processes of consultation 
and political participation are then relied upon to legitimize government inaction, 
the continued denial of substantive rights, or inequitable substantive outcomes. 
While potentially helpful, process-based entitlements may not be suffi  cient to 
challenge an inequitable institutional or political status quo. When no agreement 
is reached, the politically powerless often lose. Moreover, there are signifi cant risks 
in shifting governance responsibilities to private actors, where unequal power and 
privilege are not subject to any democratic, public accountability. 
To summarize, the risks of a procedural turn include making process rights a 
substitute for, rather than a supplement to, substantive rights or ignoring the 
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integral connection between process and substance;136 delegating respon-
sibilities for rights and freedoms to inequitable institutional or social contexts; 
reinforcing privatized power and privilege; deferring the eff ective realization of 
the promise of constitutional rights and freedoms indefi nitely, despite the rhetoric 
of social transformation; and legitimizing constitutional law as progressive 
despite its failure to attain signifi cant substantive results.
Despite these risks, we should not reject the procedural turn in constitu-
tional law. We cannot expect judges to have the knowledge, political will, or 
institutional capacity to elaborate the substantive outcomes necessary for greater 
eff ective freedom and equality. It is critical to seek equitable and inclusive 
processes of contemporary constitutionalism that reinforce participatory democracy 
in our social, economic, and political institutions, and empower those historically 
excluded from power and privilege as decision makers and change makers. Th us, 
while it is useful to recognize and celebrate procedural turn, we need to be vigilant 
in ensuring that its promise outweighs its perils. 
136. See Sossin, “Th e Duty to Consult,” supra note 32 at 110. Sossin writes: “Th e future of 
procedural justice thus rests with whether a more just process is able to facilitate more just 
outcomes.”
